Abstract-We introduce a new problem of broadcast source coding with a discrimination requirement -there is an eavesdropping user from whom we wish to withhold the true message in an entropic sense. Binning can achieve the Slepian-Wolf rate, but at the cost of full information leakage to the eavesdropper. Our main result is a lower bound that implies that any entropically efficient broadcast scheme must be "like binning" in that it also must leak significant information to eavesdroppers
I. INTRODUCTION
At a recent CISS talk the following intriguing problem was posed by Wolf [1] : Alice possesses a file modeled as a random binary string A This also requires N H(γ) bits in the large-N limit [2] . While both strategies are equally efficient from a rate perspective, the latter will require a significantly higher decoding complexity.
Wolf then went on to add a third user, Charles, who also has an independently corrupted version C The deep underlying question that we feel Wolf is asking is whether there is any strategy that makes explicit and nontrivial use of Alice's knowledge of the sequences B N 1 and C N 1 . We attempt to formalize this indirectly by a secrecy requirement. Suppose Alice's broadcast channel has been wiretapped so that anything transmitted across it is noiselessly received by an eavesdropper, Eve. Like Bob and Charles, Eve possesses some side information E
What is the minimum number of bits Alice must now use if she wishes to deny Eve access to any more information about the message? Is NH(γ) enough? 2 We will concentrate on two specific cases. In the first Eve knows nothing about A N 1 a-priori. This setup can be viewed as a generalization of the Shannon secrecy system [3] to multiple recipients. Each recipient's side information plays the role of the key source Alice may use to communicate to them in "perfect-secrecy". In the second case, E 1 There is a simple solution to the problem from the point of view of computational complexity. Alice can "bin" the message A by breaking it up into moderately sized blocks and using an LDPC syndrome as a part of the broadcast message X. Then, Alice can simulate the LDPC decoding from both Bob's and Charles's points of view and use bit doping in the style of [7] separately for each one. This will exploit Alice's knowledge of the side information and add only a tiny increment of rate. In effect, bit doping allows us to trade a little extra rate to back off the large N asymptotics. But this is clearly not the answer to Wolf's underlying question in that this is simply an efficient way to do binning, not anything truly different. 2 Notice that in the LDPC+"bit doping" construction given earlier, Eve will end up learning most of the bits of A using her side information to decode the LDPC. The intuition behind our problem is that if the message had truly been targeted to Bob and Charles, it should not be significantly helpful to Eve.
These problems are interesting in their own right as they closely relate to Wyner's problem of communicating over a wiretap channel [4] , generalized by Csiszár and Körner [5] and further generalized by means of interaction between the recipients and sender, by Maurer [6] .
We formulate the problem in more generality in section II. In section III we present a lower bound to the minimum number of bits required, which constitutes the main result of this paper. This bound is then used to investigate the two specific cases detailed above. Upper bounds are also presented. In section IV we prove the main result and in section V we discuss the motivation behind this bound and the difficulties associated with attaining a conjectured tighter bound.
II. PROBLEM SETUP
Alice has access to an N -length random string A 
and K decoder maps,
The encoding function
outputs the update X M 1 . The decoding functions
Alice wishes to leak no more than N ∆ new bits of information about A N 1 to Eve. Accordingly we have Definition 2.2: R S is said to be an achievable ∆-secrecy rate if there exists a sequence of (NR S , N) discrimination codes such that
We will discuss two specific cases of the problem:
A. Perfect-Secrecy
In this problem Alice's file is modelled as an N -length sequence
The recipients' side information random variables are generated by passing A N 1 through independent BSCs with crossover probability γ. Denote the noise sequences as Z 
where ⊕ denotes the bit-wise XOR operation. In this problem, the eavesdropper is given no side information about A N 1 . Thus Alice's broadcasted message must be conveyed to each recipient in "perfect-secrecy" (in the Shannon sense [3] ). We can treat this as a specific case of the general problem by setting E N 1 to zero.
B. I.I.D. BSCs
This problem is similar to the one above except we give the eavesdropper side information about A N 1 . E N 1 is generated by passing A N 1 through independent BSCs with the same crossover probability, γ. Denote the noise sequence Z N 1,E (see figure 2) . So
III. RESULTS

A. General Lower Bound
For the general problem with K recipients and one eavesdropper the following lower bound holds.
Theorem 3.1: If R S is an achievable ∆-secrecy rate then
B. Perfect-Secrecy
We can apply theorem 3.1 to this problem by setting E N 1 to zero. It turns out this bound is tight.
Theorem 3.2:
For the perfect-secrecy problem, the minimum achievable ∆-secrecy rate, R * S satisfies
Thus in the case of perfect secrecy where Alice wishes to leak no information about A N 1 to the eavesdropper (∆ = 0), she cannot do better than transmitting each recipients error sequence. Alternatively, if Alice broadcasts at a rate R < R * S such that all recipients are able to decode A N 1 from her message, she must leak information to Eve at a rate greater than H(γ) − (R − H(γ))/K. In particular, for the case considered in the introduction -where ∆ = 0 and there are at least two recipients-this secrecy requirement prohibits Alice from using a short message of length NH(γ) bits.
C. I.I.D. BSCs Problem
The scheme used in the case of perfect-secrecy may be used in this one, however the lower bound of theorem 3.1 no longer matches.
Corollary 3.3: For the I.I.D. BSCs problem, the minimum achievable ∆-secrecy rate R * S satisfies
and so for ∆ = 0, R *
S > KH(γ).
These bounds are plotted in figure 3 for K = 2 and ∆ = 0.
The region between the bounds of equation (1) is shaded. Corollary 3.3 tells us that if Alice broadcasts at a rate R < (2K − 1)H(γ) − (K − 1)H(2γ(1 − γ)) such that all recipients are able to decode A N 1 from her message, she must leak information to Eve at a rate greater than
For the case considered in the introduction we see that if Alice uses an entropically efficient message of length NH(γ) she must end up leaking information to the eavesdropper.
IV. PROOFS
A. General Problem -Proof of Theorem 3.1
The bound is essentially a genie-aided one. The main idea is to give additional side information to the recipients. Specifically we suppose all recipients except one have knowledge of E N 1 , in addition to their original side-information. See figure 4 . This provides a bound to the general problem as the recipients are no worse off given this additional information. We then optimism the bound by choosing the appropriate recipient to deny the additional side information to. The motivation for using such a bound is discussed in the next section. H(2γ(1 − γ) ).
Denote the recipient that is denied access to the additional side-information as recipient l. Applying Fano's inequality to property (i) of definition 2.2 we have
We can now write a sequence of inequalities. For notational simplicity we denote A N 1 as simply A in this section and likewise for all other r.v.s. We also use the convention that summations are only taken over the term directly following.
KH(A)
− N K k=1 N (k) = k =l
H(A|B(k), E) + H(A|B(l)) + k =l
I(A; B(k), E)
+ I(A; B(l)) ≥ k =l H(A|B(k), E) − k =l
H(A|B(k), E, X) + H(A|B(l)) − H(A|B(l), X) + k =l
I(A; B(k), E) + I(A; B(l))
= k =l
I(A; X|B(k), E) + I(A; X|B(l)) + k =l
I(A; B(k), E)
+ I(A; B(l)) = k =l H(X|B(k), E) + H(X|B(l)) − k =l
H(X|B(k), E, A) − H(X|B(l), A) + k =l
I(A; B(k), E) + I(X; B(l))
Concentrating on the 3rd and 4th terms in the previous A, B(1), . . . , B(K H(X|A, B(1), . .
H(X|B(k), E, A) + H(X|B(l), A)
H(X, A, B(k), E) + H(X, A, B(l))
− k =l
H(A, B(k), E) − H(A, B(l))
≥ (K − 1)H(X, A) + H(X,), E) − k =l
= (K − 1)H(X|A) +
. , B(K), E)
+ H (A, B(1), . .
+ (K − 1)H(A) − k =l
H(A, B(k), E) − H(A, B(l)).
In the second step we have used a polymatroidal theorem ( [8] p297) for brevity. Thus
H(X|B(k), E) + H(X|B(l)) − (K − 1)H(X|A) − H(X|A, B(1), . . . , B(K), E) − H(A, B(1), . . . , B(K), E)
− (K − 1)H(A) + k =l
H(A, B(k), E) + H(A, B(l))
+ k =l
I(A; B(k), E) + I(A; B(l))
= k =l H(X|B(k), E) + H(X|B(l)) − (K − 1)H(X|A) − H(X|A, B(1), . .
. , B(K), E) + KH(A)
H(A|B(k), E) − H(A|B(l))
where we have made use of the fact that B(k), B(l) and E are conditionally independent given A. Now
Using these inequalities we arrive at Thus we have
Maximizing over l yields the desired bound.
B. Perfect-Secrecy -Proof of Theorem 3.2
Setting E N 1 to zero in theorem 3.1 we have
One way of achieving this bound is the following: Alice first performs Slepian-Wolf binning of the string A 1 , . . . , A N ∆/H(γ) using N ∆ bits (ignoring integer effects) and broadcasts the bin index. This leaks N ∆ bits of information to Eve -just enough to satisfy property (ii) of definition 2.2. From the Slepian-Wolf theorem, we know it will also enable the recipients to decode the first N ∆/H(γ) bits of the message as N → ∞, satisfying property (i). Alice then performs individual Slepian-Wolf binning of each recipients noise sequence using N (H(γ) − ∆) bits per recipient. These K bin indices are also broadcast. In the same way this information enables the recipients to decode the rest of the message. The scheme achieves a ∆-secrecy rate of R S = ∆ + K(H(γ) − ∆) which matches the bound.
C. I.I.D. BSCs -Proof of Corollary 3.3
Evaluating the lower bound of theorem 3.1 yields To see that R S > KH(γ) for ∆ = 0 and γ > 0, note the function
V. DISCUSSION
We discuss the motivation behind the genie-aided bound of theorem 3. 
As E N 1 is already known by Eve, broadcasting it reveals no new information to her. The secrecy rate achieved by this scheme is H (2γ(1 − γ) H(2γ(1 − γ)) ). Indeed figure 4 illustrates that this is strictly less than the secrecy rate achieved by the perfect-secrecy scheme over some range of γ.
This suggests Alice may be better off sending an update that gives the recipients a better idea of E N 1 . Doing so essentially kills several birds with one stone -any information about E N 1 broadcasted by Alice is useful to all recipients. Whereas for perfect-secrecy this is a luxury she is prohibited from indulging in, it may benefit her here. It is this phenomenon that makes a precise characterization of R * S (γ) tricky. The idea of the genie-aided bound is to give the message recipients enough side information about E N 1 to remove Alices incentive to transmit an update that depends directly on E N 1 .
The simplest way of achieving this is to give all recipients genie-access to E N 1 . We can do better though -knowledge of E N 1 need only be giving to K − 1 of them, as this is sufficient to remove Alices desire to broadcast some component of E N 1 in that doing so will only benefit a single recipient.
The update scheme described above can generalized and used to tighten the upper bound of corollary 5.1, i.e. Alice first broadcasts N ∆ bits of A This conjecture would imply that any approach to doing distributed source coding will behave just like binning in that even if it intends to target at a particular recipient it will end up benefitting all recipients.
